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Wrongful Discharge of Attorneys: A




In recent years, the legal profession has witnessed an explosion
of litigation and scholarly discussion concerning the cause of action
of wrongful discharge. From the initial rumblings of a few scattered
opinions,' wrongful discharge, in both its contract and tort varia-
tions,2 has erupted into the field of employment law as an expanding
exception to the employment at will doctrine.' This doctrine has
given such employees a right not to be fired when their discharge
violates an implied term of the employment contract or is contrary to
an established principle of public policy. Although the law concern-
ing wrongful discharge is still in its infancy, it would be difficult to
find a legal journal that has not published at least one article on the
subject,' a law student who has not researched the issue as part of a
moot court exercise or summer associate assignment, 5 or an area of
employment at will that has not been the subject of a wrongful dis-
* Law secretary to the Honorable Alan B. Handler, Associate Justice, New Jersey Su-
preme Court. J.D., 1987, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I would like to thank Profes-
sor Clyde W. Summers and the Honorable Edmund B. Spaeth Jr., Senior Fellow at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School for their advice in preparing this Article.
I. See, e.g., Petermann v. Teamsters Local 369, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25
(1959) (discharge for refusing to commit perjury jeopardized public policy in favor of honest
testimony and thus was an abuse of employer's contractual rights); Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (absolute right of discharge threatens public policy
of improved labor relations; discharge of employee for refusing sexual advances of superior was
in bad faith and amounted to breach of contract); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373
Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1974) (all employment contracts contain an implied covenant of
good faith which limits the employer's right to discharge).
2. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981) (discussing various theories of tort and contract recovery).
3. Under the employment at will doctrine, an employer does not have to justify his dis-
charge of an employee. See Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time
for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 482 (1976).
4. See Greenbaum, Toward A Common Law of Employment Discrimination, 58 TEM-
PLE L.Q. 65, 65-66 n.4 (1985) (surveying some of the recent scholarly writings on wrongful
discharge).
5. The University of Pennsylvania first year legal writing program has included a wrong-
ful discharge exercise each of the past three years. See also S. TuRow, ONE L 29-30 (1978)
(describing a wrongful discharge first year assignment at Harvard Law School in 1975).
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charge suit. 6
One part of the private sector at will employment market - the
legal profession - has so far remained miraculously untouched by
the fallout of this explosion of litigation. The paucity of cases involv-
ing legal employees is in some ways surprising. One would expect
that lawyers, who are frequently blamed for the litigious nature of
American society, would be especially zealous in seeking the aid of
the courts to protect their employment rights. Experience, however,
has shown that members of other professions are more likely to sue
their employers when discharged for refusing to perform acts which
they believe to be prohibited by professional codes of ethics.7 To
date, however, there does not appear to be a single reported decision
in which a private sector attorney has sued his firm or corporate em-
ployer claiming to have been discharged for refusing to violate the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility or the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.8 This Article will explore the legal foundations
of such a lawsuit. 9
This Article proposes that courts in jurisdictions which have
adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility10 develop a
cause of action for wrongful discharge which would prohibit a legal
employer1" from firing a lawyer for refusal to perform an act which
the lawyer reasonably believes would violate the Code of Professional
6. See, e.g., Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (vice-president of a confec-
tions company); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (doc-
tor involved in drug research); Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983)
(insurance company claims manager).
7. See, e.g., Pierce, 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505; Wood v. Upjohn Co., No. 6093-1-11, slip
op. (Wash. App. Sept. 4, 1984) (doctors); Warthen v. Toms River Community Memorial
Hosp., 199 N.J. Super. 18, 488 A.2d 229 (App. Div. 1985) (nurses); Kalman v. Grand Union
Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728 (App. Div. 1982) (pharmacists).
8. In 1984, a state industrial appeals judge successfully brought an action challenging
his suspension for refusing to violate the Code's provisions regarding the unauthorized practice
of law by allowing lay representatives to argue before the appeals board. Lowry v. Industrial
Insurance Appeals Board, 102 Wash. 2d 58, 684 P.2d 678 (1984). Also in 1984, a Los Angeles
Superior Court jury awarded $250,000 to a staff attorney of an insurance company who was
discharged for failing to obey orders not to disclose certain settlement offers to policyholders.
See Riseley v. Maryland Casualty Co., described in Townley & Updike, Personnel Practices
Newsletter, Jan. 1985.
9. Although such speculation is beyond the scope of this Article, two reasons why such
suits are rare suggest themselves. First, law firms often are retained for their ability to keep
their clients out of court and can be expected to be even more protective of themselves. Sec-
ond, considering the fact that the bar of any given state is something of a closed society,
lawyers who have been wrongfully discharged might feel that it is better to suffer in silence
than to bring an action which might brand them as "troublemakers" and make them less
desirable employees in the eyes of other legal employers in the state.
10. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981) [hereinafter MODEL CODE
or CODE].
II. In the context of this Article, "legal employer" means the partnership of a law firm
or the corporation employing in-house counsel.
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Responsibility. While at first glance it would seem that merely pro-
viding protection in situations where the requested act in fact would
have been a violation would be sufficient, the application of the
Code's provisions is such a subtle art that, in many situations, what
constitutes a violation may be subject to good faith debate.12 To en-
courage ethical behavior, an associate or subordinate lawyer" should
be protected as long as his interpretation of the rules was reasonable
at the time he made the decision.
Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct," however, a
different standard is required. While the Model Rules acknowledge
that good faith doubts can exist in the application of a rule in a
particular situation, they also explicitly resolve these doubts in favor
of the supervising lawyer. A subordinate lawyer cannot be found in
violation of the Rules if he acts in accordance with a supervisory
lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional
duty.' 5 Because a subordinate lawyer can violate the Rules even
while acting at the direction of another attorney," however, courts in
Model Rules jurisdictions should protect such lawyers from dis-
charge in situations where the supervisory lawyer fails to provide a
defense of his interpretation of the Model Rules, or the defense of-
fered is patently inadequate.
Part II of this Article illustrates how a cause of action for
wrongful discharge can benefit a lawyer who has been pressured by
his employer to violate the Code or Model Rules. Part III examines
how this cause of action could develop within the existing body of
wrongful discharge law. Part IV explores how this cause of action
would be applied under the Code and Model Rules. Finally, this Ar-
ticle concludes that a cause of action for wrongful discharge would
provide a salutary remedy in situations where the ideal of self-en-
forcing standards of professional responsibility breaks down.
II. Wrongful Discharge of Attorneys: The Need for Protection
Although discharges of lawyers over disputes involving profes-
sional responsibility is still only a theoretical topic of litigation, the
12. See G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 461 (1985).
13. In this article, the terms associate, meaning a non-partner lawyer working in a law
firm, and subordinate lawyer, meaning a lawyer working on a corporation's in-house legal
staff, will be treated as substantial equivalents unless the context indicates otherwise.
14. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1985) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
15. MODEL RULES Rule 5.2(b).
16. MODEL RULES Rule 5.2(a).
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potential for these suits is real. The Model Rules explicitly recognize
the possibility of such conflicts, and attempt to provide guidelines for
their resolution.1 Furthermore, there are circumstances in all three
major areas of private sector legal employment, 18 small firm prac-
tice, in-house counsel, and large firm practice, that make associates
especially vulnerable to pressure to behave in an unethical manner.
A. Small Firm Associates
Lawyers who practice in firms of less than six attorneys19 are
the foot soldiers of the American legal system. They handle most of
the day-to-day legal transactions - real estate closings, drafting of
wills, personal injury suits, representation of small businesses, di-
vorce, and criminal defense - which account for most of the contact
the average citizen has with the law. 20 Life in the trenches, however,
is not always pretty. Although small firm lawyers may be free of
some of the pressures imposed on larger firms by large institutional
clients,2" economic survival can be an even more powerful motivation
to cut ethical corners. Moreover, small firms probably will lack the
procedural machinery suggested by many commentators and, to
some extent, the rules themselves, to discover and resolve questions
of legal ethics.2 Finally, one must take a closer look at the economic
position of the lawyers who may be asked to place their jobs before
their professional responsibilities. A surplus of recent law school
graduates currently exists which results in both a shortage of entry-
level jobs and low starting salaries. In 1985, for example, one study
17. MODEL RULES Rules 5.1, 5.2. These rules are primarily concerned with imposing
disciplinary sanctions; their strengths and weaknesses as rules governing wrongful discharge
actions are discussed infra notes 155-74 and accompanying text.
18. For obvious reasons, this Article will not discuss solo practitioners. Although many
issues discussed in this Article would be relevant to a discussion of employment of public
sector lawyers, see Schneyer, Limited Tenure for Lawyers and the Structure of Lawyer Client
Relations: A Critique of the Lawyer's Proposed Right to Sue for Wrongful Discharge, 59
NEB. L. REV. 11, 15 (1980), the special problems of lawyers working in the public sector are
beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of some of these issues, see Moran, Dis-
charge Rights of Attorneys in the Excepted Service, 33 LAB. L.J. 46 (1982).
19. This Article will follow the convention of the New Jersey State Bar Association and
use six lawyers as the dividing line between large and small firms. 116 N.J.L.J. 441, 449 n.20
(Oct. 3, 1985).
20. In New Jersey, for example, two-thirds of all attorneys practice alone or in firms of
less than six lawyers. 116 N.J. L.J. 441, 449, col. 2. (Oct. 3, 1985).
21. See Kalish, The Attorney's Role in the Private Organization, 59 NEB. L. REV. I, 3-4
(1980) (contrasting small firm and large firm practice).
22. See Schneyer, supra note 18, at 16-17; Note, A Remedy for the Discharge of Pro-
fessional Employees Who Refuse to Perform Unethical or Illegal Acts: A Proposal in Aid of
Professional Ethics, 28 VAND. L. REV. 805, 830-34 (1975); MODEL RULES Rule 5.1, Comment
2.
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found that almost sixty percent of new lawyers entering small firm
practice earned less than $20,000 in their first year.23 Since these
new lawyers have little economic security, and even small firms can
offer employment on "take it or leave it" terms, 24 the potential exists
for economic coercion of associates to perform unethical acts. Asso-
ciates in such circumstances need more protection than is provided
by their option (and some have argued obligation) to quit the offend-
ing firm and seek employment elsewhere.2 5
B. In-House Counsel
In the case of small firm practice, the associate receives at least
some protection from the fact that his employers, the firm's partners,
are also bound by the requirements of legal ethics. The second group
of private sector lawyers, in-house counsel, usually do not enjoy such
solace and face special difficulties when confronted by requests to
perform unethical acts. In-house counsel derive all of their profes-
sional income from one client-employer. 6 Consequently, this may
deprive them of the economic independence usually enjoyed by pri-
vate practitioners who may not suffer as permanent an economic im-
pact if they refuse clients who request performance of unethical
acts. In addition, although the Model Rules contain provisions
guiding the behavior of lawyers in the corporate setting, 28 the "sup-
port system" of other lawyers, which plays such an important role in
resolving ethical dilemmas in the firm context, is likely to be less
effective in a corporate setting.2 9 An in-house counsel, therefore, may
have to make ethical stands on his own.
A lawyer who contributes to management decisions also may
face a dilemma when the business expectation of a "team player"30
conflicts with his professional obligations. Some commentators be-
lieve the effectiveness of staff counsel as an ethical restraint on cor-
23. 116 N.J L.J. at 449, col. 1-2 (study performed by the New Jersey State Bar
Association).
24. Id. at 441, col. 2 (one recent graduate noted "[t]he horror of it ...is that a firm
knows if you don't take an offer, somebody else will.").
25. See Schneyer, supra note 18, at 17 ("It is difficult to see how the associate has been
injured if she happens to be fired before fulfilling her duty to quit.").
26. Schneyer, supra note 18, at 14.
27. Kalish, supra note 21, at 3.
28. MODEL RULES Rule 1.13 (organization as client) provides procedures for seeking
reconsideration or remedy of illegal acts of a corporate client. MODEL RULES Rule 5.1(b)
places on a supervisory lawyer in an in-house setting the duty to ensure that conduct of
subordinate in-house lawyers conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
29. See Note, supra note 22, at 831.
30. Kalish, supra note 21, at 5.
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porate activity depends upon the counsel's credibility. Repeatedly
casting staff counsel in the role of critic and objector to management
policy threatens this credibility."s In many companies, therefore, the
expected role for the lawyer may be that of a well paid drone, who
informs management of the black-letter law and then implements
management's decisions. Under these circumstances, legal assurance
that counsel cannot lose his job for upholding his professional ethics
could serve as an effective counterweight to economic and institu-
tional pressures.
C. Large Firm Lawyers
The lawyers seemingly least in need of the protection provided
by a wrongful discharge action are associates of large law firms.
First, unlike in-house counsel, large firm associates receive their in-
structions from lawyers who are obligated to uphold the Code or
Model Rules. In a Model Rules jurisdiction, senior lawyers also must
ensure that the associates' activities conform to the Rules. 2 Second,
large firms have the resources to provide associates with a body of
experienced lawyers and established policies of internal review,
which can reduce the frequency with which associates may be or-
dered to violate their professional ethics. 3 Third, a large firm associ-
ate is less likely to be ordered to perform an unethical act because,
typically, large firms have the luxury of economic independence.
This independence enables them to refuse unethical requests or to
condition the firm's continued representation on the client's ethical
behavior. 4 At least one commentator has considered that because
the position of large firm associates is sufficiently secure, the added
protection of an action for wrongful discharge is not required. 5
Large firms, however, are capable of committing ethical viola-
31. Schaefer, Prfessional Tenure: Is it Really a Solution? 59 NEB. L. REV. 28, 31-32
(1980). The author, a vice-president (law) of the Union Pacific Railroad, opposed a wrongful
discharge cause of action on the grounds that it would further isolate corporate attorneys from
the decision-making process. Id. at 34. It is difficult to see how failure to protect lawyers who
refuse to perform unethical acts will improve business ethics, unless one assumes that forcing
the staff attorney to stick with management on "small" violations will increase his credibility
to dissuade the corporation from "large" violations.
32. See MODEL RULES Rule 5.1.
33. See Note, supra note 22, at 831-33 (describing informal resolution of most ethical
disputes and calling for exhaustion of internal firm procedures as a prerequisite formaintain-
ing a wrongful discharge action).
34. See Schneyer, supra note 18, at 15. See also MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(e) (scope of
representation within the rules), Rule 1.16(a) (prohibiting representation of a client where
such representation will result in a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law), and MODEL CODE DR 7-102 (representing a client within the bounds of the law).
35. See Schneyer, supra note 18, at 15-16.
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tions. When they do so, the breach frequently is of impressive mag-
nitude.3 6 Moreover, if a firm becomes too large, it may cease to func-
tion as a firm. Instead, it resembles a large corporation, with the
inherent problems of institutional loyalty.37 The larger a firm be-
comes, the greater the chance that its management structure will be
unresponsive to the needs of associates for ethical direction. 8 Fur-
thermore, it is possible, especially in branch offices, for an entire
matter to slip between the cracks of a supervisory system. An associ-.
ate in a questionable ethical position may be compelled to go over
the head of his supervisor to the home office,39 a process that gives
rise to a different set of difficult choices for the associate.'0 Large
firm associates may require protection infrequently. When they do
need protection, however, they need it as much as any other private
sector lawyer who is asked to violate standards of professional
conduct.
While the proposed cause of action provides relief for those law-
yers who otherwise might sacrifice their employment rather than
abide by an ethically questionable order, it does so only as a means
to an end. The ultimate goal is to safeguard compliance with both
the letter and the spirit of the Code and Model Rules. The following
36. See, e.g., Glaberson, Engardio, Crock & Ticer, A Question of Integrity at Blue-Chip
Law Firms, Bus. WK., Apr. 7, 1986, at 76-80 [hereinafter Bus. WK.] (describing Rogers &
Wells agreements to pay $40 million to customers defrauded by one of the firm's clients in a
"Ponzi scheme" of which the firm was aware; Cravath, Swaine & Moore's alleged involvement
in an illegal $1.3 million payoff to an advisor to the Sultan of Oman to secure a contract for
Ashland Oil Inc., one of whose directors is a Cravath partner; and the role numerous indiscre-
tions by Venable, Baetjer & Howard played in the collapse of the Maryland Savings Share
Insurance Corp.).
37. Note, Discharge of Professional Employees: Protecting Against Dismissal for Acts
Within a Professional Code of Ethics, II COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 149, 171 n.103 (1980)
[hereinafter Discharge of Professional Employees] (statement of a former chairman of Gen-
eral Motors comparing disclosure of violations in the name of professional responsibility to
employee disloyalty and industrial espionage). See also Note, The Application of Title VII to
Law Firm Partnership Decisions: Women Struggle to Join the Club, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 841,
854 (1983) (comparing large law firms to corporations).
38. See Levinson, Ethics Inside the Law Firm, Book Review, 36 VAND. L. REV. 847-51
(1983) (applying critique of corporate management presented in D. EWING, DO IT MY WAY
OR YOU'RE FIRED (1983) to law firms). "[Autocratic firms] . . . reject any expression of con-
cern by an associate and the firm may deny promotion or discharge the associate from employ-
ment if the associate persists in questioning the partner's instructions." Id. at 851.
39. For example, most of Rogers & Wells' allegedly wrongful conduct with respect to J.
David Dominelli's Ponzi scheme occurred in the firm's San Diego office. It was in fact the
firm's London office that first raised objections to the client's activities. See Bus. WK., supra
note 36, at 80.
40. See, e.g., Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974)
(employee discharge for going over the head of his supervisor to report actual safety defect in
the company's product did not give rise to an action for wrongful discharge). The Geary court,
however, did recognize that the result might have been different if the employee had some sort
of professional obligation to act as he did. Id. at 178.
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sections will show that the proposed standard does not give
subordinate lawyers free reign to replace their employers' legitimate
instructions with their own moral values. Rather, it seeks to uphold
the mandates of professional responsibility by removing the fear of
discharge from the calculus undertaken by a lawyer who confronts
an arguable question of professional conduct. In short, it seeks to
make ethical conduct as easy as possible. 1
III. Wrongful Discharge in Professional Employment
Although commentators disagree about where one class of
wrongful discharge suits end and the others begin,"2 it is fair to say
that an employee can draw support from two potential sources to lay
claim to rights exceeding those of an at will employee: the course of
dealing of the employer and external sources of public policy.
A. Course of Dealing
The first basis for claiming an exemption from at will treatment
arises from within the employment relationship itself. An employee
may reasonably expect that certain procedural safeguards protect his
employment because of a representation in the employment con-
tract43 or from the course of dealing of the parties during the em-
ployment relationship." Where an employer has instituted such pro-
cedures as an internal grievance process, notice of discharge, or
severance pay, the employer cannot discharge the employee without
honoring these contractual commitments. 5 The trend in these cases
is to focus on the use of employee handbooks to flesh out the terms
of the employment contract.46 As one court noted,
41. See Note, supra note 22, at 806.
42. Compare Discharge of Professional Employee, supra note 37 at 159-64 and Note,
Protecting At-Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in
Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1818-24 (1980) (describing judicial limitations on at-will
employment in terms of implied contract or public policy grounds) with Pugh v. See's Candies,
Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 322-28, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 922-27 (1981) (separating tort and
contract public policy cases).
43. See, e.g., Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Ind., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 95, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222,
224 (1976) (employee stipulated he would leave his former place of employment only in ex-
change for a promise of permanent employment and dismissal only for cause).
44. See. e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., III Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722 (1980); Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (looking to length and nature of
the employment relationship to see if an implied promise to discharge for cause only has been
created).
45. See cases cited supra note 44; Weiner v. McGraw Hill Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 465,
443 N.E.2d 441, 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1982).
46. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980).
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when an employer of a substantial number of employees circu-
lates a manual that, when fairly read, provides that certain ben-
efits are an incident of the employment (including, especially,
job security provisions), the judiciary . . . should construe them
in accordance with the reasonable expectation of the
employees.""
It is tempting to base a lawyer's professional responsibility
wrongful discharge claim on these grounds, considering either the
Code or the Model Rules to be the equivalent of an employee hand-
book. Rules of legal conduct define how a lawyer is supposed to act
in certain situations; law firms and corporate employers know that
the lawyer is bound to conform his conduct to the state's standards
of professional responsibility. Furthermore, under the Model Rules,
a subordinate lawyer knows that a supervisory lawyer has an affirm-
ative duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that the subordinate
upholds his professional obligations."8 Thus, some terms and condi-
tions of legal employment are defined by the Code or Model Rules.
In fact, other professionals occasionally expressly incorporate profes-
sional codes of ethics as terms of their employment contracts.4 9 If a
firm has a general policy to discipline unethical lawyers or an infor-
mal grievance procedure to resolve internal disputes as to the mean-
ing of the Code or Model Rules, 0 legal employment could come
within the course of dealing-employee handbook wrongful discharge
cases.
There are problems with this view, however. First, it is question-
able whether it is accurate to describe the Code or Model Rules as
benefits incident to employment. Second, as the case quoted above
illustrates, courts place great weight on terms which reasonably ap-
pear to be job security provisions," which the Code and Model
Rules do not. Finally, the rationale for binding employers to the
terms of an employee handbook is that they could reasonably expect
such interpretations of language they themselves have drafted.5 2 This
is certainly not the case with the Code or Model Rules. While law-
47. Woolley v. Hoffmann LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 297-98, 491 A.2d 1257, 1264
(1985).
48. MODEL RULEs Rule 5.1.
49. See Wood v. Upjohn Co., No. 6093-1-11 slip op. (Wash. App. September 4, 1984)
(employment contract of doctor serving as corporate officer incorporated American Medical
Association's code of ethics).
50. See Woolley, 99 N.J. at 307-08, 491 A.2d 1257, 1269-70; Weiner v. McGraw-Hill,
57 N.Y.2d 458, 460, 443 N.E.2d 441, 445 (1982) (discussing obligation of employers to com-
ply with established grievance procedures before discharging an employee).
51. See, e.g., Woolley, 99 N.J. at 297-98, 491 A.2d at 1264.
52. Id. at 306, 491 A.2d 1269.
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yers in individual cases may be able to establish claims based on
their firms' adoption of the Model Rules or the Code as an internal
disciplinary standard or of an internal dispute resolution procedure,
a general right of recovery will have to come from another source.
B. Legal Ethics as Public Policy
Those cases which hold that an employee cannot be discharged
for a reason that contravenes a recognized principle of public policy
illustrate the most flexible basis for a wrongful discharge suit.5 3 This
theory has been applied through both contract and tort law on the
grounds that such a discharge is illegal because an explicit contract
term providing for discharge for such a reason would be unenforce-
able on grounds of public policy 5 or on the grounds that the law
created a legal duty from the employer to the employee not to dis-
charge the employee for such reasons.5 Although whether the cause
of action sounds in contract or in tort will have important conse-
quences to litigants concerned with seeking punitive damages or dif-
ferent statutes of limitations,56 the process of establishing the cause
of action is more or less the same, and the final nature of the action
will probably be determined more than anything else by whether the
state in question recognizes the tort or contract branch of the public
policy cause of action.5
1. Professional Responsibility as Public Policy.-Whether
the action is in tort or contract, one must show that the discharge
violates some recognized public policy. 8 Although some courts have
found that they are capable of discerning public policy on their own
initiative,59 most courts defer to an independent statutory" or consti-
53. See, e.g., Petermann v. Teamsters Local 369, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25
(1959); Tamaney v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
54. See, e.g., Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25.
55. See, e.g., Tamaney, 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839.
56. See Note, supra note 42, at 1843-44 (discussing difference between tort and contract
based analyses).
57. For a table detailing which states recognize the various tort and contract causes of
action, see B.N.A. Labor Relations Reporter, Individual Employment Rights Manual 505:51
(State Rulings Chart) (1987).
58. See, e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 899 (3d Cir. 1983) ("The
key question in considering the tort claim is therefore whether a discharge for disagreement
with the employer's legislative agenda . . . sufficiently implicate[s] a recognized facet of pub-
lic policy.").
59. The most frequently cited example of this is Monge, 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549, in
which the court found that allowing discharge of an employee who resisted sexual advances of
her supervisor violated the public policy in favor of improved labor relations.
60. See Note, supra note 42 at 1822-23 (public policy cause of action usually limited to
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tutional 1 definition of public policy. Although codes of professional
conduct are not statutes, they do serve a closely analogous func-
tion.62 Therefore, the codes of many professions may serve as reliable
expressions of public policy.
In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,63 the New Jersey Su-
preme Court noted that "[i]n certain instances, a professional code
of ethics may contain an expression of public policy."6 Pierce in-
volved a claim by a doctor that she was constructively discharged for
refusing to conduct laboiatory development of a drug on the grounds
that it contained saccharin. Dr. Pierce claimed that any work on a
drug containing this potentially carcinogenic substance would violate
her interpretation of the Hippocratic oath. Although the court re-
jected Dr. Pierce's claim on the grounds that her refusal to continue
development of the drug was based on her own personal morals
rather than any professional code of conduct,65 the discussion of her
claim provides valuable insight into the use of professional codes as
standards of public policy.
The Pierce court began by recognizing the public policy cause
of action66 and stated that standards of public policy play an impor-
tant role in employment relationships. The court then noted,
Employees will be secure in knowing that their jobs are safe
if they exercise their rights in accordance with a clear mandate
of public policy. On the other hand, employers will know that
unless they act contrary to public policy, they may discharge
employees at will for any reason.6
7
Obviously, this standard places a premium on designating un-
ambiguous sources of public policy so that both employers and em-
ployees can be sure of their relative rights. While recognizing that
the duty of professional employees to abide by their professions' code
of ethics "may oblige them to decline to perform acts required by
situations where employer's action would undermine a statutory public policy); Discharge of
Professional Employee, supra note 37, at 160 (congress or state legislatures are the presumed
source of public policy pronouncements).
61. See Novosel, 721 F.2d at 899 (first amendment of the federal constitution and arti-
cle I section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution are cognizable expressions of public policy).
62. For a discussion of the role of professional codes of ethics in regulating the profes-
sion and safeguarding the health, safety, and welfare of the public, see Discharge of Profes-
sional Employees, supra note 37, at 165-68.
63. 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
64. Id. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512.
65. Id. at 74-75, 417 A.2d at 513-14.
66. The court recognized the cause of action sounded in both tort and contract. Id. at
72, 417 A.2d at 512.
67. Id. at 73, 417 A.2d at 512.
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their employers," 68 the Pierce court made it clear that it was the
incompatibility of the employer's request with public policy, not with
a professional code, that makes a discharge actionable. 9 Before a
discharge of an employee refusing to violate a professional code be-
comes actionable, therefore, the code itself must be considered a
clear mandate of public policy. According to the Pierce court:
In certain instances, a professional code of ethics may con-
tain an expression of public policy. However, not all such
sources express a clear mandate of public policy. For example, a
code of ethics designed to serve only the interests of a profession
or an administrative regulation concerned with technical matters
probably would not suffice. 0
Once the court answers this threshold question of defining pub-
lic policy in terms of a professional code, it then must inquire into
the reasons for the employee's refusal to perform the requested act.
This involves making a distinction between professional ethics and
individual morals. Under this standard, an employee who refuses to
work on a project he or she believes is unethical (meaning it is in
conflict with a clear mandate of public policy) would be protected,
while an employee who refuses to work on account of individual con-
science does so at his or her own risk. 1 The court noted that chaos
would result if every employee could determine, according to his per-
sonal conscience, whether a project begun by his employer should
continue.72 Limiting this right to factors recognized in professional
codes, therefore, strikes a balance between the supervisory authority
of the employer and the individual conscience of the employee.
Two subsequent New Jersey cases illustrate the practical impli-
cations of this distinction. In Warthen v. Toms River Community
Memorial Hosp.,18 a nurse refused to dialyze a terminally ill patient
on the grounds that doing so would be a breach of medical ethics
since the Code for Nurses provides that "[ijf personally opposed to
the delivery of care in a particular case because of the nature of the
health problem or the procedures to be used, the nurse is justified in
68. Id., at 71, 417 A.2d at 512.
69. Id. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512 ("unless an employee at will identifies a specific expres-
sion of public policy, he may be discharged with or without cause."). For another analysis of
this case, praising its reasoning but criticizing its result, see Discharge of Professional Em-
ployees, supra note 37, at 180-87.
70. Id. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512.
71. Id. at 75, 417 A.2d at 514.
72. Id.
73. 199 N.J. Super. 18, 488 A.2d 229 (App. Div. 1985).
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refusing to participate.""' A state appellate court upheld the nurse's
discharge. It found that the Code of Nurses was not a clear mandate
of public policy because it defined a standard of conduct beneficial
only to the individual nurse and not to the public at large.7 5 In Kal-
man v. Grand Union Co.,7 6 however, a pharmacist proved that the
rules of the Board of Pharmacy qualified as clear mandates of public
policy." He also showed that the professional code and state law
justified his refusal to leave his pharmacy unattended by a pharma-
cist while the rest of the store was open for business.78 Thus, the
court found that his discharge for disobeying his employer's order to
leave the pharmacy unstaffed during store hours was wrongful.
2. Legal Ethics as a Clear Mandate of Public Pol-
icy.-Protecting the integrity of the legal process has long been rec-
ognized as a public policy important enough to justify exceptions to
the at will employment rule.7 Petermann v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters,8" one of the earliest at will wrongful discharge cases,
held that an employer could not discharge an employee for refusing
to commit perjury because the "presence of false testimony in any
proceeding tends to interfere with the proper administration of jus-
tice." 1 For similar reasons, employers who have discharged employ-
ees for serving on juries have been found liable in wrongful discharge
suits. One court observed that the "community's interest in having
its citizens serve on jury duty [is] so important that an employer,
who interferes with that interest by discharging an employee who
served on a jury, should be required to compensate his employee."82
If one views the Code and Model Rules as benefitting the public by
protecting the integrity of the legal process, this view will satisfy the
first part of the Pierce test, thereby allowing a lawyer who has been
discharged for refusing to perform what he believed to be an unethi-
74. Id. at 26, 488 A.2d at 233 (quoting American Nurses Assoc., Code for Nurses with
Interpretive Statements Rule 1.4 at 5 (1981)).
75. Id. at 27, 488 A.2d at 233. The court also found that the nurse's refusal was based
on her own personal morals rather than any provision of the Code of Nurses. Id. at 28, 488
A.2d at 234.
76. 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728 (App. Div. 1982).
77. Id. at 158, 443 A.2d at 730 (noting that the purpose of registering pharmacists is to
protect the public from the dangers attendant upon the sale of drugs by unqualified persons).
78. Id. at 159, 443 A.2d at 730-31.
79. Kalish, supra note 21, at 7-8 (basing his proposal of a wrongful discharge action for
lawyers on the need to protect the integrity of the legal process).
80. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
81. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27.
82. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 218, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (1975); accord, Reuther v.
Fowler & Williams Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 32, 386 A.2d 119, 120 (1978).
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cal act to maintain an action for wrongful discharge.
A brief survey of the treatment of legal ethics standards outside
the employment law context shows that courts already consider the
Code and Model Rules to be clear mandates of public policy. In the
context of disqualification of attorneys from representation on partic-
ular matters when representation would violate the Code or Model
Rules, courts have found the principles embodied in these ethical
standards to outweigh the conflicting public policy that a litigant
may choose his own lawyer.83 For example, in Wagner v. Lehman
Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc.,84 the court disqualified Wagner's attorney af-
ter determining that he was guilty of numerous ethical violations."
The court, weighing the need to ensure ethical conduct against Wag-
ner's right to freely chosen counsel, found that the Code violations at
issue created an "appearance of impropriety" that outweighed any
interest Wagner had in representation by counsel of his choice."
The use of legal ethics violations as evidence of legal malprac-
tice also strongly supports consideration of the Code and Model
Rules as clear mandates of public policy. Codes of legal ethics play a
large role in defining the standard of care required for the practice
of law. In Florida, for example, although a violation of the Code is
not considered negligence per se, it may be used as some evidence of
negligence.87 Other states have equated a violation of the Code to a
violation of a statute, both of which serve as evidence of negli-
gence." As a court in Michigan has stated:
The Code of Professional Responsibility is a standard of
practice for attorneys which expresses in general terms the stan-
dards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their rela-
83. Actually, disqualification is usually justified on the grounds that allowing continued
representation in the face of such violations would threaten the integrity of the legal profession
by creating, at the very least, an appearance of impropriety. See MODEL CODE Canon 9; DR
9-101.
84. 646 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. II1. 1986).
85. One of the lawyers in the firm representing Wagner had, in concert with Wagner,
contacted a party opponent without contacting the party's lawyer and persuaded the party to
testify against a co-defendant in return for a percentage of the plaintiff's recovery. These acts
violated DR 7-104(a), prohibiting communication with a party represented by counsel, and
DR 7-109(c), prohibiting contingent fee compensation of a witness. In addition, another law-
yer in the firm had taken an active role in an investigation of the defendants while working as
a lawyer for the Securities and Exchange Commission. Since this lawyer played an active role
in Wagner's case, his participation violated DR 9-101(b), prohibiting private employment of a
lawyer in a matter in which he was involved as a public employee. See Wagner, 646 F. Supp.
at 655-69.
86. Id. at 660.
87. Oberon Investments, N.V. v. Angel, Cohen, Rogovin, 492 So. 2d 1113, 1114 n.2
(Fla. App. 1986).
88. Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, 649, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1381 (1986).
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tionships with the public, the legal system, and the legal profes-
sion. Holding a specific client unable to rely on the same
standards in his professional relations with his own attorney
would be patently unfair. We hold that, as with statutes, a viola-
tion of the Code is rebuttable evidence of malpractice.89
If violation of the Code or Model Rules is evidence of a lawyer's civil
liability, the Code or Rules should be a sufficient mandate of public
policy to justify the conclusion that an employer who attempts to
subvert the Code by threat of discharge will face civil liability for his
actions.
IV. Wrongful Discharge Under the Code and Model Rules
This Article proposes that under the Code, a lawyer should be
protected from discharge whenever he refuses to comply with an em-
ployer's request which he reasonably believes would violate the Code.
Under the Model Rules, such a standard is precluded by Model
Rules 5.1 and 5.2, which define the ethical relationship between su-
pervisory and subordinate lawyers. The Rules, however, impose a
duty upon supervisory lawyers to ensure that subordinates uphold
their ethical obligations and, furthermore, provide that a subordinate
lawyer cannot escape discipline on the grounds that he was acting on
the instruction of another.90 These two provisions place upon the le-
gal employer a duty not only to discuss the ethical question with the
subordinate, but to provide a reasoned explanation of why the pro-
posed action would not violate the Model Rules. Absent such a rea-
soned explanation, the subordinate should be protected from
discharge.
The primary objection to the use of a wrongful discharge action
in a legal employment setting is that it will interfere with the super-
visory lawyer's zealous representation of his client.' 1 This objection
has some validity. A primary purpose of creating the cause of action
is to deter legal employers from asking their lawyers to perform
what may be unethical acts. Too much deterrence, however, might
have a chilling effect on zealous representation.' 2 On a more practi-
cal level, allowing subordinate lawyers too much freedom to define
89. Lipton v. Boesky, 110 Mich. App. 589, 313 N.W.2d 163, 166-67 (1981). It would
appear that California pays even greater deference to its own Rules of Professional Conduct.
See Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 303, 311, 578 P.2d 935, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218, 222 (1978)
(specific rule governing a situation can establish the standard of care).
90. MODEL RULES Rule 5.2(a).
91. See MODEL CODE Canon 7.
92. See Schneyer, supra note 18, at 13.
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the scope of their duties will subject the supervisory lawyer to end-
less second guessing, which will make managing a law firm or legal
department even more difficult.9 s Finally, the possibility exists that
lawyers who have been asked to leave the firm for other reasons will
seize upon the cause of action as a pretext to seek a damage award
against former employers.9' Although these objections are substan-
tial, the prerequisites of the cause of action, as well as the nature of
the legal profession, make it unlikely that the potential drawbacks of
the cause of action will outweigh its benefits to both the lawyers who
bring such suits and the legal process as a whole.
The proposed cause of action draws a clear distinction between
professional ethics and personal morals. This distinction is a thresh-
old question of law which would normally be resolved on a motion
for summary judgment. As the court in Pierce observed: "[a]n em-
ployee at will who refuses to work for an employer in answer to a
call of conscience should recognize that other employees and their
employer might heed a different call."9 A law firm, therefore, as one
of the terms of the lawyer's employment, has the right to expect its
associates to comply with its determination of how to represent the
firm's clients, so long as this determination does not threaten a clear
mandate of public policy.96 In the end, the cause of action should
protect the public by safeguarding the integrity of the legal process,
not the conscience of any one individual.
Another consequence of the distinction between professional
ethics and personal morals is that certain provisions of the Code will
not be sufficient legal grounds to refuse an employer's directive. The
Ethical Considerations, for example, are useful interpretive guides to
the Disciplinary Rules. They cannot, however, serve as clear man-
dates of public policy because they are aspirational in nature.97 Fur-
thermore, some Disciplinary Rules are cast in permissive, rather
than mandatory language.98 In these cases, while it is clearly in the
public interest to allow a client's counsel discretion to act, this dis-
cretion is properly vested in the firm and not in any one associate
who is handling a particular aspect of the representation.99 For ex-
93. See Note, supra note 22, at 832.
94. Id. at 836.
95. Pierce, 84 N.J. at 75, 417 A.2d at 514.
96. Id. at 73, 417 A.2d at 512.
97. Schneyer, supra note 18, at 19.
98. See, e.g., MODEL CODE DR 4-101(C), allowing disclosure of confidences in certain
situations, and DR 7-101(B), permitting a lawyer to use his professional judgment to waive
certain rights of his client.
99. One commentator has suggested reversing this allocation of authority and giving the
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ample, assume an associate arguing a summary judgment motion
fails to raise a non-frivolous but unpersuasive ground for dismissal
despite a contrary order from his supervising partner. The associate
is clearly within his rights under DR 7-101(B)(1).'0 Because there
was nothing unethical about the request, however, the associate
should not be protected from discharge. The wrongful discharge ac-
tion only protects an associate from ethical dilemmas; it does not
condone an at will employee's insubordination in situations when no
ethical issues are involved.
A. Wrongful Discharge Under the Code
Situations in which a subordinate lawyer might be asked to per-
form an unethical act fall into two categories. The first involves "bad
man" cases in which a legal employer decides that a Code violation
is in the client's best interest and uses his position to coerce a
subordinate into committing the breach. Most commentators have
addressed this class of cases.' The second category includes em-
ployers acting without malice who force a subordinate lawyer into
ethical dilemmas.0 2 The law of lawyering is sufficiently subtle that
reasonable minds may differ as to its meaning. 0 3 Moreover, these
doubts can be compounded by conflicting resolutions of problems in
other jurisdictions and, in cases where the Code has undergone re-
cent amendment, by the confusion which typically accompanies a
change in legal standards. In such situations, even in the absense of
any bad faith, a subordinate lawyer may have to choose between up-
holding the ethics of his profession and retaining his job.
1. Bad Faith Requests to Violate the Code.-It is difficult to
conceive of any principled objection to imposing civil liability on an
employer who knowingly attempts to coerce a lawyer into violating
the Code.' 0 ' To show how such a cause of action would be applied,
individual lawyer, who is the lawyer most involved in the representation, the discretion to make
ethical decisions. See Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility, and
Competent Representation, 1982 Wisc. L. REV. 473, 532.
100. See supra note 98.
101. See, e.g., Kalish, supra note 21, at 4; Schneyer, supra note 18, at 20; Confer, Pro-
fessional Tenure as a Means to Promote Ethical Compliance in the Civil Discovery Process,
59 NEB. L. REV. 35, 36 (1980).
102. See MODEL CODE DR 1-102(A)(2) ("A lawyer may not circumvent a Disciplinary
Rule through the actions of another.").
103. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, at 461.
104. But cf., Schaefer, supra note 31, at 31-34 (arguing that such a rule will isolate staff
attorneys from the rest of management); Confer, supra note 102, at 39 (arguing that the harm
to the confidence of the public in the legal profession caused by the airing of "dirty laundry"
would outweigh the value of the cause of action in deterring future abuses).
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however, it is helpful to consider examples of how an actionable situ-
ation could arise in various legal settings. To the extent that such
hypotheticals are plausible, they support the proposition that the
need for a recognized cause of action is greater than the present lack
of cases suggests.
Assume a partner in a small law firm calls into his office a re-
cently hired associate and assigns the associate to defend a valued
client in a personal injury suit. The partner informs the associate
that the case is to be settled as quickly as possible and gives the
associate the plaintiffs phone number. When the associate asks for
the phone number of the plaintiff's lawyer, the partner replies: "in
this office we deal directly with the other party whenever possible;
there's no sense going through some plaintiff's lawyer who will only
make things more expensive and time consuming for everyone." The
associate points out that direct contact with the opposing party
would violate DR 7-104.1°5 The partner merely holds up a file of
resumes of lawyers who have recently passed the state bar exam and
informs the associate that if he does not make the phone call there
are plenty of other people with his qualifications who will."'6 If the
associate still refuses to make the call and is fired, under the pro-
posed standard, he should be allowed to recover in an action for
wrongful discharge.
The above example represents the simplest possible case: a
knowing request to violate a mandatory Model Code disciplinary
rule coupled with an explicit threat of discharge. Most cases will not
be that simple. Assume, for instance, a situation where in-house
counsel representing his company in an antitrust action receives a
document request for all communications between the company's
president and the management of other companies allegedly involved
in a price fixing scheme.1 7 When he presents the request to the com-
pany president, the president produces a file containing a "smoking
gun." After the attorney explains the significance of the documents
and the discovery request, the president informs the attorney that
the company cannot afford to lose this lawsuit and reminds the attor-
ney where his loyalties should lie.108 The attorney discloses the docu-
105. MODEL CODE DR 7-104(A)(2) (prohibiting communication with a party known to
be represented by counsel).
106. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (discussing economic vulnerability of
young associates in small firm practice).
107. See Confer, supra note 101, at 33-37 (describing incentives for unethical behavior
in discovery).
108. See Schneyer, supra note 18, at 25 (describing a similar hypothetical involving a
request to use perjured testimony); Schaefer, supra note 31, at 31-34 (discussing conflicting
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ments anyway, and the company loses the case. A short time after-
wards, the company dismisses the attorney, citing his poor trial
performance.
This is a much more textured factual scenario for the applica-
tion of a wrongful discharge cause of action. First, there is a ques-
tion concerning whether the president in fact requested the attorney
to refuse to comply with the discovery request. In addition, even as-
suming the president made the request, there is still a question as to
whether his refusal to "lose" the documents was the motivation for
the discharge. The company probably would argue that it no longer
had confidence in an attorney whose failure to win a case resulted in
a substantial judgment against the company. Finally, there is reason
to believe that the lawyer might be prohibited from testifying to the
conversation with the company president on the grounds that the
conversation involved confidential communications.
On the issues of whether the lawyer was in fact requested to
disobey the discovery request and whether he was fired for disclosing
the "smoking gun," there are questions of fact which would have to
be resolved at a trial. The lawyer would have the burden of proving
that his failure to violate the Code was the reason for the dis-
charge.109 In this context, however, two observations should be made.
First, people in positions of authority do not always have to phrase
their orders as commands in order to communicate their inten-
tions.1"' The meaning of the words used by the president will have to
be determined by the jury. Second, even if the jury determines that
no order was intended at the time, the discharge would still be
wrongful if the reason the company is dissatisfied with the lawyer's
performance is that he placed ethical factors before company loyalty.
There would still be a jury question as to whether the company's
proffered explanation for the discharge was merely a pretext for re-
taliation against counsel for refusing to engage in unethical behav-
loyalties of in-house counsel). The hypothetical suggested here would involve a violation of
MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A)(3) (a lawyer shall not conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that
which he is required to reveal).
109. See Note, supra note 22 at 833-34 (discussing burden of proof).
110. For a literary example of this, see W. Shakespeare, Richard !1, act V, scene iv,
lines 7-1I:
And speaking it he wishfully looked on me,
As who should say "I would thou wert the man
That would divorce this terror from my heart!"
Meaning the king at Pomfret. Come, let's go.
I am the king's friend, and will rid his foe.
After Exton kills Richard II, Henry IV later claims to have intended nothing of the kind. See
act V, scene vi, lines 34-44.
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ior." While this may be a difficult determination of fact, it is no
more difficult here than in the other areas of employment law in
which it is confronted.
11 2
Focusing on the confidence question, at least one commentator
has raised the objection that the language of DR 4-101(C)(4), which
allows an attorney to disclose client confidences in order to collect a
fee or to defend against an accusation of wrongful conduct, might
not allow disclosure in cases where the lawyer has already been paid
for services rendered and brings a tort action against his former em-
ployer." 3 While this may be a plausible interpretation of the lan-
guage of the rule itself, it is contrary to the policy behind the excep-
tion. DR 4-101(C)(4) itself cites to ABA Opinion 250," which
provides that "if it became necessary for the attorney to bring an
action against the client, the client's privilege could not prevent the
attorney from disclosing what was essential as a means of obtaining
or defending his own rights."'" 5 If DR 4-101(C)(4) were interpreted
otherwise, employers could engage in such behavior with impunity
because it would be a rare case in which an attorney could prove
such misconduct without resorting to the use of confidential commu-
nications."" Therefore, if the cause of action is to exist at all, the
lawyer has a strong argument that he must be able to disclose the
client communications."1
Although the previous two hypotheticals involved lawyers in
small firms and in-house counsel, one could easily conceive of situa-
tions in which the settings were reversed, or in which either scenario
was played out in a large law firm. Still, one hopes that a large firm
has an internal procedure to protect an associate from possible ex-
ploitation by a rogue partner." 8 Structural protection, however,
might not aid a lawyer in circumstances when the request to perform
the objectionable act is due not to bad faith, but to a reasonable
Ill. See Note, supra note 22, at 833-34.
112. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (discussing
treatment of pretextual reasons for discharge in litigation under Title VII).
113. See Schneyer, supra note 18, at 25.
114. MODEL CODE DR 4-101(C)(4) n.19.
115. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 250 (1943). See
also Hull v. Celenese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975).
116. See Note, supra note 22 at 832-33 (discussing problems of proof).
117. It should not be necessary to resort to a policy argument to establish a right to
disclose such confidential communications in a MODEL RULES jurisdiction, since MODEL
RULES Rule 1.6(b)(2) permits the lawyer to reveal information related to the representation
"to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer
and the client."
118. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (describing the institutional factors
providing greater assurance of ethical behavior in large law firms).
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disagreement as to the requirements of the Code.
2. When Reasonable Minds Differ.-As previously mentioned,
bad faith by the employer is not necessary for a lawyer to be con-
fronted with a choice between insubordination or committing what
he believes to be a breach of ethical duty. In part, the Code itself is
the source of problems of this sort. As one textbook on professional
responsibility observes:
Many people believed that the Code, the product of several
years work by a distinguished commission, had resolved all ques-
tions which were worth considering. Almost as soon as signifi-
cant numbers of people began to look seriously at the Code,.
however, they realized that the Code had answered many ques-
tions badly and left others unresolved altogether. 19
Even when the Code is a reliable guide, the issues involved are occa-
sionally so subtle that good faith doubts exist as to the outcome of
the application of the Code to a particular set of facts. 120 These fac-
tors can be complicated either by a lack of controlling authority in-
terpreting the provisions, or by conflicting interpretations in other
jurisdictions. While situations are more dramatic when both parties
know the proposed action is wrong, cases in which a supervisory and
subordinate lawyer in good faith reach conflicting resolutions of an
issue will probably be more common.'
The one reported case involving employee discipline arising out
of a refusal to violate the Code centered on the question of good-
faith doubt. In Lowry v. Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, 2' a
lawyer employed as an industrial appeals judge was suspended for
three days for refusing to permit lay persons to represent parties
before him, despite a rule promulgated by the Board allowing lay
representation.' 23 Lowry claimed he could not obey the regulation
because to do so would be a violation of the Disciplinary Rules that
prohibit aiding the unauthorized practice of law2 4 and that two state
attorney general letter opinions supported his interpretation of the
119. T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY 1 (1984) [hereinafter MORGAN & ROTUNDA].
120. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, at 461.
121. This, of course, assumes that the great majority of lawyers in fact try to behave
ethically, and the low percentage of lawyers ever disciplined during their careers, (one study
has put this figure at two-tenths of one percent, see Bus. WK. supra note 36, at 76), is due to
the overall ethical character of the bar rather than to lax enforcement.
122. 102 Wash. 2d 58, 684 P.2d 678 (1984).
123. Id. at 61, 684 P.2d at 679.
124. See, e.g., MODEL CODE DR 1-101, DR 1-102, DR 3-101(A).
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Code. The Board, however, argued that the issue had never been
resolved in the state courts and at least one other state allowed lay
representation. 1 5 The Supreme Court of Washington, in resolving
this dispute in favor of Lowry, observed:
We would do individual courage and integrity a great injus-
tice were we to require employees to follow unquestioningly
their master's bidding. A person with courage enough to risk
employer sanctions, hostile reactions from colleagues, or possible
discharge and the disgrace that accompanies it by disobeying a
superior's order on the belief that it would be illegal or unethical
to act otherwise, is entitled to a determination of the reasonable-
ness of his belief. 12
6
The court found that Lowry's belief that compliance with the
regulation would have violated the Code was reasonable and ruled
that his suspension was improper. 2 7 Although Lowry was a public
employee and confronted a suspension rather than a discharge, it ap-
pears that neither of these factors influenced the court's decision. 128
In addition, while the court placed some weight on the fact that
Lowry's position was supported by an attorney general position pa-
per,"'29 this appears to have been considered merely an aid, rather
than a prerequisite, to establishing the reasonableness of his belief.
Finally, it is important to note that the court found it unnecessary to
determine whether the requested action actually violated the Code; a
reasonable belief on the part of the employee was enough.
The most controversial aspect of the cause of action proposed by
this Article is that an employee may recover merely by showing that
his interpretation of the Code's requirements was reasonable. Other
proposals have conditioned recovery on proof by the discharged law-
yer that the requested action actually violated the Code. These pro-
posals argue that an associate should bear the risk of challenging a
partner's interpretation of a questionable area of the law.' 30 While
several reasons have been advanced for drawing the line at actual
violations, the vitality of these arguments does not withstand close
inspection.
125. See Eagle Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 217 Cal. 244, 18 P.2d 341
(1933). Such representation is allowed before some federal agencies. See, e.g., Walters v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (non-lawyers allowed to act as repre-
sentatives in proceedings before the Veterans' Administration).
126. Lowry, 102 Wash. 2d at 64-65, 684 P.2d at 682.
127. Id. at 67, 684 P.2d at 682.
128. Id. at 61, 684 P.2d at 679.
129. Id. at 67, 684 P.2d at 682.
130. See, e.g., Kalish, supra note 21, at 6.
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One commentator has argued that any standard other than re-
quiring an actual violation would elevate individual ideas to a posi-
tion of primacy. 131 This argument is based on a premise that ethical
objections are indistinguishable from questions of individual con-
science.' 32 The distinction between individual morals and profes-
sional ethics required by the Pierce test as a prerequisite to estab-
lishing a cause of action, however, undermines this premise.'33
The same commentator also has expressed concern over the pos-
sibility of an associate being rewarded for an incorrect determination
of the law.' 34 This objection, however, loses sight of the fact that the
subordinate lawyer will have the burden of showing his position was
reasonable. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a subordinate lawyer,
whose prospects for job advancement will depend upon staying in his
employer's good graces, 35 will object to a more experienced lawyer's
resolution of an ethical question unless he is sure his own resolution
is very reasonable. In such circumstances, discussion of ethical ques-
tions should be encouraged as much as possible.1 36 Giving a
subordinate safe refuge in the reasonableness of his position might
provide the necessary encouragement for him to risk employer sanc-
tions and make an ethical objection to an employer's request. With-
out the ability to rely on the reasonableness of his belief, subordinate
lawyers probably will defer to their superiors in any case in which
the law is not absolutely clear. This would reduce the burden of ex-
planation required of the employer to a mere "straight face" stan-
dard, which will not advance significantly the cause of furthering
legal ethics.
Perhaps the most persuasive objection to the reasonableness
standard is that an experienced supervisory lawyer is so much more
likely than his subordinate to reach a correct resolution of an ethical
problem that there is little gain from allowing a cause of action
against the partner unless the partner is later shown to have been
mistaken. 37 Several counterweights, however, support the reasona-
bleness standard. First, the objection is based on the premise that the
131. See Note, supra note 22, at 832.
132. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text (applying the Pierce standard).
133. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text (discussion the Pierce test).
134. See Note, supra note 22, at 832.
135. See Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (recognizing discretionary
nature of partnership decisions, although concluding that Title VIi applies to such decisions).
136. See Schneyer, supra note 18, at 16.
137. One commentator has taken this a step further and suggested limiting recovery to
situations where the employer's request was both incorrect and in bad faith. See Schneyer,
supra note 18, at 18 n.14.
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employer is in possession of superior legal knowledge. In the in-house
counsel setting, however, where the need for protection is perhaps
the greatest, there is no assurance that the superior will even be a
lawyer. Moreover, the rationale proposed by opponents emphasizes
the "defer to superiors as a matter of course" manner of thinking,
which the cause of action is intended to combat. The purpose of
granting a right to sue for wrongful discharge is to ensure that the
actual course of representation conforms as closely as possible to the
mandates of public policy expressed in the Code. The fact that a
lawyer has the right to refuse to act as long as his objection is rea-
sonable puts him in a much better position to force a reluctant supe-
rior' 18 into a full exploration of the problem. From this process a
correct resolution is more likely to result. 139
Furthermore, the fact that this cause of action exists creates a
duty on the part of the associate to engage in ethical debate. With-
out any intended insubordination or disrespect for the employer, the
lawyer can claim in good conscience that he has a duty to serve as a
"devil's advocate" in order to explore more fully close ethical ques-
tions. Forcing a subordinate lawyer to take full responsibility for his
ethical choices also eliminates the specter of subordinate lawyers at-
tempting to raise a "Nuremberg" defense as a means of mitigating
punishment.""
There are also circumstances in which the fact that the supervi-
sory lawyer is right has little to do with his superior knowledge of
the law. Assume, for example, that while Lowry's case was pending
the Washington Supreme Court had "vindicated" the Board's posi-
tion in Lowry regarding representation by non-lawyers by a 4-3 vote,
with the justices making their decisions on the basis of a policy of
safeguarding the integrity of the legal process by providing inexpen-
sive procedures for resolution of administrative claims."14 Under an
actual violation standard, Lowry's suspension would have been up-
held, even though he did not have the benefit of the court's guidance
138. Even those against providing wrongful discharge protection to lawyers at least rec-
ognize the possibility that large fees and long term loyalties can bias partners towards over-
zealous representation in interpreting their professional duties. See id. While Schneyer dis-
counted this argument due to lack of empirical support, the recent rash of ethical disputes
involving partners at such firms as Rogers & Wells and Cravath, Swaine, & Moore adds some
support to the validity of the hypothesis. See Bus. WK., supra note 36, at 76.
139. See Schneyer, supra note 18, at 16 (recognizing the value of law firms making
ethical judgments collectively).
140. See Levinson, supra note 38, at 851 n.9 (describing an occasional practice under
the current CODE).
141. See Lowry, 102 Wash. 2d at 60, 684 P.2d at 679.
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at the time he was forced to make an ethical decision."1 2 In such
circumstances, it is unfair to have the job security of the employee
turn on how the court, out of necessity, eventually decided a close
question of law." 8 Instead, the outcome should depend upon the rea-
sonableness of the employee's resolution of the unsettled legal ques-
tions at the time he was forced to act."
The problems related to unsettled law also give rise to another
issue: Adoption of an actual violation standard will force courts to
decide disciplinary questions in the context of a tort suit. The actual
violation standard not only requires the resolution of legal ethics is-
sues outside of the disciplinary procedures that have been established
to interpret and enforce ethical standards,"' but it also risks present-
ing the dispute without an accurate assessment of the impact of its
decision on clients and the legal process as a whole. Following the
lead of the Lowry court in basing its decision on the reasonableness
of the position taken appears to be the optimal standard to apply
when deciding a lawyer's claim that he has been wrongfully
discharged.
The reasonableness standard will not pose an unbearable burden
on legal employers. Rather it will contribute to a more accurate reso-
lution of ethical questions. For example, assume an associate is con-
cerned that the client he represents in a transaction is perpetrating a
fraud. On the basis of non-privileged information available to him,
the associate believes he can make a good case that the client is com-
mitting a fraud and presents this evidence to the partner in charge of
the case. The partner, who had no knowledge of the information dis-
closed by the associate, discloses to the associate confidential com-
munications which, in conjunction with the non-privileged informa-
tion, clearly establish that the client is engaged in a fraud. The
partner expresses the firm's concerns to the client and urges the cli-
142. If a 4-3 decision resolving this issue had come down before the employee's refusal
to act, however, this case becomes one of either unjustified employee insubordination or a bad
faith request on the part of the employer.
143. It would also be a different case if Lowry had been asked to challenge the attorney
general's interpretation in court rather than by violating it because MODEL CODE DR 7-
102(A)(2) permits good faith arguments for modification or reversal of existing law.
144. There is some precedent for this standard in the public employment sector. In
Heng v. Foster, 63 I1l. App. 3d 30, 379 N.E.2d 688 (1978), for example, a public sector nurse
was reinstated after being discharged for refusing to report a theft committed by a fellow
employee which she learned of while counselling him in a therapy session. The court found
that the nurse's belief that disclosure was barred by federal patient confidentiality guidelines
was reasonable, and that it was unnecessary to determine the actual scope of the guidelines.
Accord Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm., 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 233, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
145. See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 119, at 28 (discussing regulation of the
legal profession).
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ent to rectify the fraud. When the client refuses to do so, the firm
withdraws on the grounds that continuing the representation would
involve the firm in assisting the client to commit a fraudulent act.1"6
The associate, however, wishes to go further. As the lawyer who
handled most of the contact with the other party, the associate feels
compelled to disclose the fraud pursuant to DR 7-102(B)(I)."" The
partner orders the associate not to do so because the partner believes
that, absent disclosure of the privileged information, the non-privi-
leged evidence discovered by the associate does not meet the rule's
requirement of information "clearly establishing" the existence of
the fraud." 8
This hypothetical is typical of the situation in which the reason-
able belief test is intended to operate. DR 7-102(B) is a mandatory
section ("he shall reveal the fraud"). Thus, under the Pierce test, the
associate does not have to defer to the partner's decision and, in fact,
can be disciplined if he makes the wrong decision concerning his
conflicting obligations under the Code.149 Absent the associate's right
to rely on the reasonableness of his interpretation of the Code, the
partner might decide that the risks of being disciplined for failing to
disclose the fraud are minimal, especially considering the infre-
quency with which disciplinary sanctions are imposed.' 50 Once the
associate is free from the constraint of having to stake his job on
whether his employer has committed a violation,15' the associate is in
146. MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A)(7) prohibits a lawyer from counseling or assisting a
client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent.
147. MODEL CODE DR 7-102(B) states that:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud
upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same,
and if his client refuses or is unable to do so he shall reveal the fraud to the
affected person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privi-
leged communication.
148. If the roles in the hypothetical are reversed, with the partner desiring disclosure
and the associate counseling to maintain confidentiality, a decision by the associate to refuse
disclosure but to remain with the firm if the partner discloses the confidences is not an example
of passing his moral dilemma onto someone else. The associate is merely forcing the other
lawyer to bear the full disciplinary consequences of his decision on his own. In this case, the
associate is not "passing the buck" anywhere else but where it should have stopped in the first
place.
149. Unless the requirements of DR 7-102(B)(1) are satisfied, revealing the fraud to
third parties would violate DR 4-101, which requires preservation of client confidences, assum-
ing none of the exceptions in DR 4-101(C) apply.
150. See Bus. WK. supra note 36, at 76 (only two-tenths of one percent of lawyers in
America are ever disciplined, and proceedings against large firms are almost unknown).
151. See Discharge of Professional Employees, supra note 37, at 173 (observing that
most professional societies refrain from reprimands for anything less than unlawful activity,
although noting that the legal profession appears to take its enforcement role more seriously
than most).
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an almost impartial position to evaluate the merits of the partner's
resolution of the ethical conflict. If anything, the associate will favor
the partner slightly, because the partner still has the power to con-
trol the associate's work assignments 5 2 and career progress.153 In
addition, the associate must consider the possibility that if the part-
ner is right, the associate faces possible discipline.
In short, only in rare cases will the partner who has correctly
resolved the issue be unable to persuade the associate. Even more
rare will be the case in which a court, faced with facts in which the
associate was wrong and had been counseled correctly by an exper-
ienced attorney, will find that the associate's mistaken interpretation
of law was reasonable. In such a rare situation, the possibility of
which is suggested by the Lowry case, 54 the reasonableness standard
still serves to reward the practice of attorneys who take independent
responsibility for the ethical integrity of their actions. Meanwhile, in
the average case, the standard serves the profession well by ensuring
that the vigorous discussion needed to correctly resolve these dis-
putes will occur within the lawyer's office before the violation takes
place.
B. Wrongful Discharge Under the Model Rules
In many respects, the perspective from which the Model Code
views the legal profession dictates the application of the reasonable
belief test. With very few exceptions, the Code was drafted on the
assumption that lawyers practice law as individuals. In the few
places where the Code acknowledges the existence of law firms,
6 5
such as in the provisions regarding firm advertising or conflicts of
interest, it treats the firm as if it were a single lawyer. Thus, it is no
surprise that the standard for determining the wrongfulness of a law-
yer's discharge under the Code focuses on the reasonableness of an
individual lawyer's belief. The Model Rules, on the other hand, evi-
152. One inherent weakness of the wrongful discharge cause of action is that there is
always some level of employer retaliation which will go unremedied. See Note, supra note 22,
at 830. In this context, the possibility of such retaliation is not an unmitigated evil.
153. While partnership decisions are still highly discretionary, see Discharge of Profes-
sional Employees, supra note 37, at 852, some recent inroads have been made into even this
bastion of absolute employer power. See Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984)
(partnership decisions are subject to sex discrimination prohibition of Title VII).
154. In Lowry there was no determination as to the merits of the employer's interpreta-
tion of the rules, and, in fact, it appears that the court treated the employer's argument with
skepticism. See Lowry, 102 Wash. 2d at 67, 684 P.2d at 682.
155. See, e.g., MODEL CODE DR 2-101, DR 2-105 (regulating legal advertising), DR 4-
101(D) (protecting confidences of a firm's clients), DR 5-101 - 5-107 (avoiding conflicts of
interest).
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dence a much greater awareness of the different contexts in which
lawyers provide services.156 Perhaps as a result of this different per-
spective, the wrongful discharge standard most compatible with the
provisions of the Model Rules focuses on the reasonableness of the
legal employer's representations rather than the legal employee's
beliefs.
This different focus under the Model Rules results primarily
from Model Rules 5.1 and 5.2,117 which govern the relations between
supervising and subordinate lawyers. These two provisions have no
counterpart in the Model Code.158 Rule 5.1 imposes on a supervisory
lawyer (including a law firm partner) the duty to take reasonable
steps to ensure that the conduct of lawyers under his supervision
conforms to the Model Rules. Rule 5.2(a) imposes upon subordinate
lawyers a duty to uphold the Model Rules even if instructed not to
do so by their employer. 5 9 These two provisions, standing alone,
amount to an explicit statement of the policies that jurisdictions
must implicitly derive in order to justify the reasonable belief test.
The Model Rules, however, make two additional observations. They
explicitly recognize that good faith doubts can exist as to the appli-
cation of a Rule to particular facts, and they anticipate that some-
times supervisory and subordinate lawyers, who share responsibility
for a particular action, will reach conflicting good faith conclusions
as to the requirements of professional conduct.
The Model Rules response to this situation is Rule 5.2(b),
which provides that "[a] subordinate lawyer does not violate the
rules of professional conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a
supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of
professional duty."1 60 This provision proscribes the application of the
reasonable belief standard in Model Rule jurisdictions. The premise
of the reasonable belief standard is that since a lawyer must bear the
ultimate disciplinary responsibility for his actions under the Code,
his employer should defer to the lawyer's reasonable interpretation
of his professional obligations. Under Rule 5.2(b), however, the
subordinate lawyer is confronted with no such dilemma; as long as
his employer's resolution of an arguable question of professional con-
duct is reasonable, an employee does not have to choose between in-
156. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.13 (organization as client), Rule 5.1 (responsibili-
ties of supervisory lawyer), Rule 5.2 (responsibilities of subordinate lawyer).
157. MODEL RULES Rule 5.1, Rule 5.2.
158. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, at 451.
159. MODEL RULES Rule 5.2(a).
160. MODEL RULES Rule 5.2(b).
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subordinate behavior and potential exposure to disciplinary action.
This exculpatory provision changes the nature of inquiry in wrongful
discharge actions under the Model Rules.
Model Rule 5.2(b) makes the decision to follow one of two rea-
sonable but conflicting ethical questions a legitimate exercise of a
legal employer's right to supervise his employees. Analytically, this
places a subordinate lawyer, confronted with an arguable question of
professional ethics under the Rules, in a position similar to that of a
subordinate lawyer who is ordered to file a motion which, albeit non-
frivolous, is highly unlikely to be granted."" Although both
subordinate lawyers might feel that the request is not in the best
interest of the legal system, or even of the client, neither one faces
the dilemma of choosing between possible discharge and possible dis-
ciplinary action. Refusal to comply with the superior's request, how-
ever, undermines the legitimate expectation of the superior who
should be able to rely on the fact that his employees will comply
with his decisions on trial strategy or reasonable resolutions of argu-
able ethical questions.' 2 In these situations, the employees' objec-
tions are based on individual preferences rather than professional
ethics and are thus unprotected under the second part of the Pierce
test.
One could interpret this Rules provision standing by itself as not
passing the first part of the Pierce test because it appears to benefit
the individual lawyer rather than the public.' 5 This interpretation,
however, would appear to be too restrictive a reading of the protec-
tion of public policy provided by the Model Rules. The drafters of
the Model Rules made a principled decision that, since good faith
doubts about the Model Rules' requirements are inevitable, 164 it
would be in the public's best interest to provide a safe harbor for
subordinate lawyers in situations where reasonable minds differ as to
the meaning of a rule, considering the facts that the supervisory law-
yer usually has more experience in making ethical judgments l' 5 and
161. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (arguing that the exercise of discre-
tion under the non-mandatory provisions of the MODEL CODE is within the scope of the em-
ployer's supervisory power).
162. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. See also Pierce, 84 N.J. at 73, 417 A.2d
at 512 ("employers will know that unless they act contrary to public policy, they may dis-
charge employees at will for any reason.").
163. See Pierce, 84 N.J. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512 (a code of ethics designed to serve only
the interests of the profession does not qualify as a clear mandate of public policy). See also
Warthen, 199 N.J. Super. at 27, 488 A.2d at 233 (describing one such self-serving professional
code).
164. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, at 461.
165. See Schneyer, supra note 18, at 18 (arguing against the establishment of a wrong-
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that uncertainty concerning the relative responsibilities of the two
lawyers could have a chilling effect on zealous representation.' 66 The
drafters thus made a rational presumption in favor of the supervisory
lawyer's resolution of ethical disputes. However, the rule has the
same effect as the reasonable belief test in that it forces the lawyers
involved into a full discussion of the ethical consequences of the pro-
posed action and places on the employer alone the discretionary risks
involved in adopting his resolution of an ethical question. 67
Although the Model Rules give the supervisory lawyer the right
to direct a subordinate to follow one of two reasonable but conflict-
ing ethical positions, this right is predicated on the supervisory law-
yer first providing the associate with a timely explanation of the rea-
sonableness of this resolution. 68 The subordinate lawyer is still
subject to discipline under Rule 5.2(a) unless the supervisor's posi-
tion is reasonable. Therefore, it would be patently unfair to allow an
employer to discharge a subordinate lawyer who refused to obey a
bald order of questionable ethics and then to permit the employer to
escape liability by providing a full reasoned defense of his position at
trial. Under the scheme established by Rule 5.2, the subordinate
lawyer serves as guardian of the public interest by ensuring that the
superior's order is reasonably consistent with the requirements of the
Model Rules before complying with the request. 16 9 In order to carry
out this function, the subordinate needs to have the arguments sup-
porting the ethical validity of the action before him when he makes
his decision whether or not to perform the act. Moreover, establish-
ing the reasonableness of the request is crucial for the subordinate to
establish his own defense to a charge of unethical behavior.
While in some cases the Code and Model Rules will yield differ-
ent results, most cases would come out the same under either stan-
dard. Consider, for example, how a case similar to Lowry would be
decided under the Model Rules' reasonable explanation test. Assum-
ful discharge cause of action for discharges arising out of good faith mistakes on the part of
law firm partners as to the requirements of legal ethics).
166. See id. at 13 (noting that one consequence of a wrongful discharge action would be
that supervisory lawyers might temper the zealousness of their representation in order to avoid
possible lawsuits by dissenting employees).
167. See supra note 148 (arguing that it would not be improper in cases where reasona-
ble doubts exist for a subordinate lawyer to refuse to perform a certain act yet remain in the
firm if the supervisory lawyer himself performs the act).
168. See Mounts, supra note 99, at 531 (discussing the MODEL RULES provisions con-
cerning supervisory and subordinate lawyers).
169. This places on the subordinate lawyer the responsibility of determining the reasona-
bleness of his employer's action. In some ways, this provision is superior to the reasonable
belief standard under the CODE, since it is more likely that a subordinate lawyer will be more
objective in evaluating his employer's position than he would be of his own.
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ing that Lowry's employer merely said "we are going to continue to
allow lay representation until the attorney general stops us," this
would not appear to be a reasonable resolution of the question. Be-
cause the subordinate lawyer could not rely on this unreasonable
statement in a subsequent disciplinary hearing on the lay representa-
tion issue, 170 he would be protected from discharge for refusing to
comply with his employer's request. As discussed previously, a law-
yer in a similar situation in a Code jurisdiction could establish a
reasonable belief that the employer's request amounted to a violation
of the Code.
171
In theory, at least, a difference in results is possible if the em-
ployer provided a reasonable justification for allowing lay representa-
tion.17 1 While the reasonableness of the employer's explanation
would remove a Model Rules lawyer's protection from discharge
(but concomitantly protect him from discipline), a Model Code law-
yer would still be protected provided that nothing in the employer's
explanation exposes the subordinate's position as unreasonable. As
has been discussed earlier, however, 73 the cases are rare in which a
subordinate lawyer will risk employer sanctions and possible disci-
pline to stand by his interpretation of the Code when the employer
has proposed a reasonable counterinterpretation.
The one objectionable consequence of the reasonable explana-
tion standard is that it permits the discharge of a lawyer who refuses
to act because he reasonably believes the requested action will vio-
late the Model Rules even though his employer has provided a rea-
sonable alternate resolution of the ethical dispute. This would be
true even if the employer's position was later found to be incorrect.
This is disturbing, because it denies an employee safe harbor in the
legality of his own actions. Closer inspection, however, reveals that
the reasonable explanation standard provides the most rational result
given the policies underlying the provisions of the Model Rules gov-
erning supervisory and subordinate lawyers.'74 The Model Code fo-
170. See MODEL RULES Rule 5.5 (prohibiting assisting others in the unauthorized prac-
tice of law).
171. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing a hypothetical variation on
the facts of Lowry, 102 Wash. 2d 58, 684 P.2d 678 (1984)).
172. See supra note 125 (discussing reasons why such representation may in fact be
permissible in some circumstances).
173. See supra text accompanying note 154.
174. Although a full discussion of the issue is beyond the scope of this Article, it should
be remembered that some states have private sector employee whistleblower provisions, see H.
HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, EMPLOYER TERMINATION, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 292-96 (1985),
which miglht affect the standards discussed in this Article. At least two states provide statutory
protection to private sector employees who refuse to perform an act they reasonably believe to
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cuses on how an individual lawyer's actions will affect the public in-
terest, and provides a subordinate lawyer with the right to rely on
the reasonableness of his belief. The Model Rules, on the other hand,
while not freeing a lawyer of all responsibility for his professional
conduct, recognize that there are public policy benefits to group reso-
lution of ethical problems which also must be considered.
In the end, a wrongful discharge action under both the Code
and the Rules recognizes a link between protection from discharge
and disciplinary responsibility for incorrect resolution of an ethical
question. Under the Code's reasonable belief standard, the
subordinate lawyer is protected from discharge if he is mistaken, but
he must suffer the disciplinary consequences of an incorrect determi-
nation. The Code assumes that a supervisory lawyer who is correct
will usually be able to persuade his employee to agree with him, thus
averting any possible harm to the public caused by a dissenting em-
ployee's Code violation. Under the Model Rules, however, the rea-
sonable explanation standard defers to the employer's decision,
which in many cases will be a collective decision made after consul-
tation with other lawyers in the firm or on the in-house counsel staff.
This standard is based on the implicit assumption that the collective
decision, provided it meets the standard of reasonableness, usually
will be correct. The shift in decision making authority from the indi-
vidual to the group parallels a reallocation of disciplinary responsi-
bility to the employer unless the employer can prove that the pro-
posed action reasonably can be found consistent with public policy as
defined by the Model Rules. Both standards in the end require dis-
cussion between the attorneys involved and depend on the
subordinate lawyer's self-interest in avoiding discipline as a safe-
guard to protect public policy. They merely differ on defining whose
risk of error, the supervisor's or the subordinate's, society would pre-
fer to bear.
V. Conclusion
This Article has argued that there are contexts in which a
wrongful discharge cause of action in the legal employment setting
would serve the purpose of furthering professional ethics and, in iso-
lated circumstances, would protect subordinate lawyers from eco-
nomic coercion by unethical employers. It has also been demon-
be a violation of a law, rule, or regulation, and one state, (New Jersey), even extends this to
incompatibility with a clear mandate of public policy. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (West
Supp. 1986), N.Y. LABOR LAW Art. 20-C, § 740(I)-(7) (McKinney 1984).
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strated that such a cause of action would be consistent with existing
wrongful discharge law, as well as the Code and Model Rules. While
a wrongful discharge action might one day provide justice for a
subordinate lawyer put out of work for upholding the ethical stan-
dards of the legal profession, it would be preferable if such a claim
never had to be brought. The true goal of the proposed cause of ac-
tion is to encourage, and in some cases force, the lawyers involved to
confer with each other in order to most accurately determine the
requirements of legal ethics. In effect, the subordinate lawyer is pro-
tected in order to free him to protect the interests of the public. In
cases where his professional protection has broken down and a law-
suit has resulted, the standards proposed in this Article have served
only half their purpose.

